"Cryptography Against Physical Attacks: Recent Results & New Directions"

Thu Dec 12, 2013 2:00 PM

Location: LTS Auditorium, 8080 Greenmead Drive

Dana Dachman-Soled
Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Studies (UMIACS)

Physical attacks compromise the security of a system by exploiting physical properties of implementations. These implementation-specific attacks, such as timing attacks and fault-induction attacks, have been launched successfully on real-life cryptosystems such as RSA, revealing a significant vulnerability of these systems. Much attention in the cryptographic community has focused on how to model physical attacks and construct cryptographic schemes that are provably secure in these strong models.

I will present our recent results related to constructing cryptographic schemes resilient to leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present results on “circuit compilers” for tampering, which allow us to take any circuit and convert it into a modified circuit that has strong tamper- resilience properties. Next, we discuss results on protocols for secure computation in untrusted, distributed settings, where an attacker may launch leakage attacks on honest parties. We will also discuss directions for future research.