@article {18497,
	title = {Bitstore: An incentive-compatible solution for blocked downloads in bittorrent},
	journal = {Proc. Joint Workshop on The Economics of Networked Systems and Incentive-Based Computing (NetEcon)},
	year = {2007},
	month = {2007///},
	abstract = {As many as 30\% of all files shared on public BitTorrentnetworks suffer from the lack of {\textquotedblleft}seeders{\textquotedblright} (peers that have
complete copies of the file being shared); peers attempting
to download such a file ({\textquotedblleft}leechers{\textquotedblright}) may have to wait indef-
initely to obtain certain file chunks that are not distributed in
the file{\textquoteright}s network of peers (the {\textquotedblleft}swarm{\textquotedblright}). We call this the
Blocked Leecher Problem (BLP).
To alleviate BLP, we propose BitStore, a larger, secure
network of BitTorrent users (not necessarily all sharing the
same content) where nodes offer their resources (such as
disk space and bandwidth) for public use. Peers sharing any
file can use the storage network to maintain replicas for each
chunk of the file. Any leecher seeking chunks that are absent
from in its own swarm can query the public network, locate
the node storing the said chunks, and retrieve them. BitStore
also provides robust incentives for nodes contributing re-
sources: In return for storing and serving chunks, such nodes
can negotiate micropayments using a second-price auction.
Peers who receive these credits may later use them to re-
trieve blocks they need from the storage network.
This paper quantifies the BLP, presents an overview of the
BitStore design, and discusses various challenges related to
storage management and incentives.
},
	author = {Ramachandran,A. and Sarma,A.D. and Feamster, Nick}
}
