%0 Book Section
%B Theory of Cryptography
%D 2008
%T Black-Box Construction of a Non-malleable Encryption Scheme from Any Semantically Secure One
%A Choi, Seung Geol
%A Dana Dachman-Soled
%A Malkin, Tal
%A Wee, Hoeteck
%E Canetti, Ran
%K Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
%K black-box constructions
%K computers and society
%K Data Encryption
%K Discrete Mathematics in Computer Science
%K Management of Computing and Information Systems
%K non-malleability
%K public-key encryption
%K semantic security
%K Systems and Data Security
%X We show how to transform any semantically secure encryption scheme into a non-malleable one, with a black-box construction that achieves a quasi-linear blow-up in the size of the ciphertext. This improves upon the previous non-black-box construction of Pass, Shelat and Vaikuntanathan (Crypto ’06). Our construction also extends readily to guarantee non-malleability under a bounded-CCA2 attack, thereby simultaneously improving on both results in the work of Cramer et al. (Asiacrypt ’07). Our construction departs from the oft-used paradigm of re-encrypting the same message with different keys and then proving consistency of encryptions; instead, we encrypt an encoding of the message with certain locally testable and self-correcting properties. We exploit the fact that low-degree polynomials are simultaneously good error-correcting codes and a secret-sharing scheme.
%B Theory of Cryptography
%S Lecture Notes in Computer Science
%I Springer Berlin Heidelberg
%P 427 - 444
%8 2008/01/01/
%@ 978-3-540-78523-1, 978-3-540-78524-8
%G eng
%U http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-78524-8_24