TY - JOUR
T1 - Handling expected polynomial-time strategies in simulation-based security proofs
JF - Journal of Cryptology
Y1 - 2008
A1 - Katz, Jonathan
A1 - Lindell,Y.
AB - The standard class of adversaries considered in cryptography is that of strict polynomial-time probabilistic machines. However, expected polynomial-time machines are often also considered. For example, there are many zero-knowledge protocols for which the only known simulation techniques run in expected (and not strict) polynomial time. In addition, it has been shown that expected polynomial-time simulation is essential for achieving constant-round black-box zero-knowledge protocols. This reliance on expected polynomial-time simulation introduces a number of conceptual and technical difficulties. In this paper, we develop techniques for dealing with expected polynomial-time adversaries in simulation-based security proofs.
VL - 21
CP - 3
M3 - 10.1007/s00145-007-9004-8
ER -