@conference {18580,
	title = {Location diversity in anonymity networks},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic society},
	series = {WPES {\textquoteright}04},
	year = {2004},
	month = {2004///},
	pages = {66 - 76},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {New York, NY, USA},
	abstract = {Anonymity networks have long relied on diversity of node location for protection against attacks---typically an adversary who can observe a larger fraction of the network can launch a more effective attack. We investigate the diversity of two deployed anonymity networks, Mixmaster and Tor, with respect to an adversary who controls a single Internet administrative domain. Specifically, we implement a variant of a recently proposed technique that passively estimates the set of administrative domains (also known as autonomous systems, or ASes) between two arbitrary end-hosts without having access to either end of the path. Using this technique, we analyze the AS-level paths that are likely to be used in these anonymity networks. We find several cases in each network where multiple nodes are in the same administrative domain. Further, many paths between nodes, and between nodes and popular endpoints, traverse the same domain.},
	keywords = {anonymity, interdomain routing, mix networks},
	isbn = {1-58113-968-3},
	doi = {10.1145/1029179.1029199},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1029179.1029199},
	author = {Feamster, Nick and Dingledine,Roger}
}
