@conference {19027,
	title = {BIND: a fine-grained attestation service for secure distributed systems},
	year = {2005},
	month = {2005},
	pages = {154 - 168},
	abstract = {In this paper we propose BIND (binding instructions and data), a fine-grained attestation service for securing distributed systems. Code attestation has recently received considerable attention in trusted computing. However, current code attestation technology is relatively immature. First, due to the great variability in software versions and configurations, verification of the hash is difficult. Second, the time-of-use and time-of-attestation discrepancy remains to be addressed, since the code may be correct at the time of the attestation, but it may be compromised by the time of use. The goal of BIND is to address these issues and make code attestation more usable in securing distributed systems. BIND offers the following properties: (1) BIND performs fine-grained attestation. Instead of attesting to the entire memory content, BIND attests only to the piece of code we are concerned about. This greatly simplifies verification. (2) BIND narrows the gap between time-of-attestation and time-of-use. BIND measures a piece of code immediately before it is executed and uses a sandboxing mechanism to protect the execution of the attested code. (3) BIND ties the code attestation with the data that the code produces, such that we can pinpoint what code has been run to generate that data. In addition, by incorporating the verification of input data integrity into the attestation, BIND offers transitive integrity verification, i.e., through one signature, we can vouch for the entire chain of processes that have performed transformations over a piece of data. BIND offers a general solution toward establishing a trusted environment for distributed system designers.},
	keywords = {BIND, binding instructions and data, code attestation, data integrity, digital signatures, distributed processing, fine-grained attestation service, input data integrity, program verification, sandboxing mechanism, secure distributed systems, signature, time-of-attestation, time-of-use, transitive integrity verification, trusted computing},
	author = {Elaine Shi and Perrig, A. and Van Doorn, L.}
}
@conference {15146,
	title = {Lower bounds on the efficiency of encryption and digital signature schemes},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing},
	series = {STOC {\textquoteright}03},
	year = {2003},
	month = {2003///},
	pages = {417 - 425},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {New York, NY, USA},
	abstract = {A central focus of modern cryptography is to investigate the weakest possible assumptions under which various cryptographic algorithms exist. Typically, a proof that a "weak" primitive (e.g., a one-way function) implies the existence of a "strong" algorithm (e.g., a private-key encryption scheme) proceeds by giving an explicit construction of the latter from the former. In addition to showing the existence of such a construction, an equally important research direction is to explore the efficiency of such constructions.Among the most fundamental cryptographic algorithms are digital signature schemes and schemes for public- or private-key encryption. Here, we show the first lower bounds on the efficiency of any encryption or signature construction based on black-box access to one-way or trapdoor one-way permutations. If S is the assumed security of the permutation π (i.e., no adversary of size S can invert π on a fraction larger than 1/S of its inputs), our results show that:Any public-key encryption scheme for m-bit messages must query π at least Ω(m log S) times.Any private-key encryption scheme for m-bit messages (with k-bit keys) must query π at least Ω(m-k/log S) times.Any signature verification algorithm for m-bit messages must query π at least Ω(m log S) times.Our bounds match known upper bounds for the case of encryption.We prove our results in an extension of the Impagliazzo-Rudich model. That is, we show that any black-box construction beating our lower bounds would imply the unconditional existence of a one-way function.},
	keywords = {black-box, digital signatures, encryption, lower bounds},
	isbn = {1-58113-674-9},
	doi = {10.1145/780542.780604},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/780542.780604},
	author = {Gennaro,Rosario and Gertner,Yael and Katz, Jonathan}
}
