@conference {19505,
	title = {The Provenance of WINE},
	booktitle = {Dependable Computing Conference (EDCC), 2012 Ninth European},
	year = {2012},
	month = {2012///},
	pages = {126 - 131},
	abstract = {The results of cyber security experiments are often impossible to reproduce, owing to the lack of adequate descriptions of the data collection and experimental processes. Such provenance information is difficult to record consistently when collecting data from distributed sensors and when sharing raw data among research groups with variable standards for documenting the steps that produce the final experimental result. In the WINE benchmark, which provides field data for cyber security experiments, we aim to make the experimental process self-documenting. The data collected includes provenance information {\textendash} such as when, where and how an attack was first observed or detected {\textendash} and allows researchers to gauge information quality. Experiments are conducted on a common test bed, which provides tools for recording each procedural step. The ability to understand the provenance of research results enables rigorous cyber security experiments, conducted at scale.},
	keywords = {Benchmark testing, CYBER SECURITY, cyber security experiments, data attacks, data collection, dependability benchmarking, distributed databases, distributed sensors, experimental research, field data, information quality, MALWARE, Pipelines, provenance, provenance information, raw data sharing, research groups, security of data, self-documenting experimental process, sensor fusion, software, variable standards, WINE, WINE benchmark},
	author = {Tudor Dumitras and Efstathopoulos, P.}
}
@conference {14658,
	title = {A theory of typed coercions and its applications},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the 14th ACM SIGPLAN international conference on Functional programming},
	series = {ICFP {\textquoteright}09},
	year = {2009},
	month = {2009///},
	pages = {329 - 340},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {New York, NY, USA},
	abstract = {A number of important program rewriting scenarios can be recast as type-directed coercion insertion. These range from more theoretical applications such as coercive subtyping and supporting overloading in type theories, to more practical applications such as integrating static and dynamically typed code using gradual typing, and inlining code to enforce security policies such as access control and provenance tracking. In this paper we give a general theory of type-directed coercion insertion. We specifically explore the inherent tradeoff between expressiveness and ambiguity--the more powerful the strategy for generating coercions, the greater the possibility of several, semantically distinct rewritings for a given program. We consider increasingly powerful coercion generation strategies, work out example applications supported by the increased power (including those mentioned above), and identify the inherent ambiguity problems of each setting, along with various techniques to tame the ambiguities.},
	keywords = {coercion insertion, gradual typing, nonambiguity, provenance, type-directed translation},
	isbn = {978-1-60558-332-7},
	doi = {10.1145/1596550.1596598},
	url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1596550.1596598},
	author = {Swamy,Nikhil and Hicks, Michael W. and Bierman,Gavin M.}
}
@conference {14696,
	title = {Fable: A Language for Enforcing User-defined Security Policies},
	booktitle = {IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008},
	year = {2008},
	month = {2008/05/18/22},
	pages = {369 - 383},
	publisher = {IEEE},
	organization = {IEEE},
	abstract = {This paper presents FABLE, a core formalism for a programming language in which programmers may specify security policies and reason that these policies are properly enforced. In FABLE, security policies can be expressed by associating security labels with the data or actions they protect. Programmers define the semantics of labels in a separate part of the program called the enforcement policy. FABLE prevents a policy from being circumvented by allowing labeled terms to be manipulated only within the enforcement policy; application code must treat labeled values abstractly. Together, these features facilitate straightforward proofs that programs implementing a particular policy achieve their high-level security goals. FABLE is flexible enough to implement a wide variety of security policies, including access control, information flow, provenance, and security automata. We have implemented FABLE as part of the LINKS web programming language; we call the resulting language SELlNKS. We report on our experience using SELlNKS to build two substantial applications, a wiki and an on-line store, equipped with a combination of access control and provenance policies. To our knowledge, no existing framework enables the enforcement of such a wide variety of security policies with an equally high level of assurance.},
	keywords = {Access control, Automata, Collaborative work, Communication system security, Computer languages, computer security, Data security, enforcement policy, FABLE, Government, high-level security goals, information flow, Information security, Language-based security, programming languages, Programming profession, provenance, security automata, security labels, security of data, user-defined security policies, verified enforcement, Web programming language},
	isbn = {978-0-7695-3168-7},
	doi = {10.1109/SP.2008.29},
	author = {Swamy,N. and Corcoran,B.J. and Hicks, Michael W.}
}
