@conference {19045,
	title = {TACKing Together Efficient Authentication, Revocation, and Privacy in VANETs},
	year = {2009},
	month = {2009},
	pages = {1 - 9},
	abstract = {Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) require a mechanism to help authenticate messages, identify valid vehicles, and remove malevolent vehicles. A public key infrastructure (PKI) can provide this functionality using certificates and fixed public keys. However, fixed keys allow an eavesdropper to associate a key with a vehicle and a location, violating drivers{\textquoteright} privacy. In this work we propose a VANET key management scheme based on temporary anonymous certified keys (TACKs). Our scheme efficiently prevents eavesdroppers from linking a vehicle{\textquoteright}s different keys and provides timely revocation of misbehaving participants while maintaining the same or less overhead for vehicle-to-vehicle communication as the current IEEE 1609.2 standard for VANET security.},
	keywords = {ad hoc networks, data privacy, eavesdropper, IEEE 1609.2 standard, Message authentication, mobile radio, public key cryptography, public key infrastructure, remove malevolent vehicle, telecommunication security, temporary anonymous certified key, valid vehicle identification, VANET key management, VANET security, vehicle-to-vehicle communication, Vehicles, vehicular ad hoc network},
	author = {Studer, A. and Elaine Shi and Bai, Fan and Perrig, A.}
}
@conference {12076,
	title = {Bootstrapping security associations for routing in mobile ad-hoc networks},
	booktitle = {IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, 2003. GLOBECOM {\textquoteright}03},
	volume = {3},
	year = {2003},
	month = {2003/12/01/5},
	pages = {1511- 1515 vol.3 - 1511- 1515 vol.3},
	publisher = {IEEE},
	organization = {IEEE},
	abstract = {To date, most solutions proposed for secure routing in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), assume that secure associations between pairs of nodes can be established on-line; e.g., by a trusted third party, by distributed trust establishment. However, establishing such security associations, with or without trusted third parties, requires reliance on routing layer security. In this paper, we eliminate this apparent cyclic dependency between security services and secure routing in MANETs and show how to bootstrap security for the routing layer. We use the notion of statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable (SUCV) identifiers to implement a secure binding between IP addresses and keys that is independent of any trusted security service. We illustrate our solution with the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol and compare it with other solutions for secure routing.},
	keywords = {ad hoc networks, bootstrapping security association, Cryptographic protocols, dynamic source routing protocol, Fabrics, Intelligent networks, IP address, IP key, IP networks, Message authentication, mobile ad-hoc network, mobile radio, Protection, Public key, public key cryptography, routing layer security reliability, routing protocols, secure routing, Security, security service, statistically unique cryptographically verification, telecommunication security},
	isbn = {0-7803-7974-8},
	doi = {10.1109/GLOCOM.2003.1258490},
	author = {Bobba,R. B and Eschenauer,L. and Gligor,V. and Arbaugh, William A.}
}
