@article {15107,
	title = {Analyzing the HB and HB+ protocols in the {\textquotedblleft}large error{\textquotedblright} case},
	journal = {IACR ePrint report},
	volume = {326},
	year = {2006},
	month = {2006///},
	pages = {2006 - 2006},
	abstract = {HB and HB+ are two shared-key, unidirectional authentication protocols whose extremelylow computational cost makes them potentially well-suited for severely resource-constrained
devices. Security of these protocols is based on the conjectured hardness of learning parity
with noise; that is, learning a secret s given {\textquotedblleft}noisy{\textquotedblright} dot products of s that are incorrect with
probability ε.
Although the problem of learning parity with noise is meaningful for any constant ε < 1/2,
existing proofs of security for HB and HB+ only imply security when ε < 1/4. In this note, we
show how to extend these proofs to the case of arbitrary ε < 1/2.
},
	author = {Katz, Jonathan and Smith,A.}
}
