@article {15098,
	title = {Two-server password-only authenticated key exchange},
	journal = {Applied Cryptography and Network Security},
	year = {2005},
	month = {2005///},
	pages = {175 - 206},
	abstract = {Typical protocols for password-based authentication assume a single server which stores all the information (e.g.), the password necessary to authenticate a user. Unfortunately, an inherent limitation of this approach (assuming low-entropy passwords are used) is that the user{\textquoteright}s password is exposed if this server is ever compromised. To address this issue, a number of schemes have been proposed in which a user{\textquoteright}s password information is shared among multiple servers, and these servers cooperate in a threshold manner when the user wants to authenticate.We show here a two-server protocol for this task assuming public parameters available to everyone in the system (as well as the adversary). Ours is the first provably-secure two-server protocol for the important password-only setting (in which the user need remember only a password, and not the servers{\textquoteright} public keys), and is the first two-server protocol (in any setting) with a proof of security in the standard model.
},
	doi = {10.1007/11496137_1},
	author = {Katz, Jonathan and MacKenzie,P. and Taban,G. and Gligor,V.}
}
